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Is Information Property? Distinctive Genetic Information Has an
Answer
KUMIKO KITAOKA*
INTRODUCTION
Senator Elizabeth Warren became a victim of the former president’s
mockery when she took a DNA test to support her claim of Native American
heritage.1 The senator publicized the test result as evidence of her
“unadmixed Native American ancestor . . . in the range of 6-10 generations
ago.”2 Unfortunately, the announcement also caused a backlash from Native
American communities.3 The Cherokee Nation issued a statement that tribal
citizenship is based upon centuries of their traditions, not DNA tests.4
Ancestry testing like the senator’s is offered by commercial companies.5
Beyond commercialized testing, genetic and genomic (“genetic/genomic”)
analysis is conducted for a variety of reasons.6 For example, genetic/genomic
research examines genetic/genomic variations among organisms to identify
morbidity-related genetic/genomic changes so that life-saving treatments can
be created.7 The increasing volume of data from genetic/genomic studies
translates into accelerated data use.8 In the field of genetics/genomics, size
and diversity are often a key to success.9 As such, databases are merged and
shared among institutions.10
* Born in Japan. George Washington University Law School LL.M. in intellectual property
(2014), J.D. (2020), Tokyo Medical University, Ph.D. in Radiology (2015). Have represented patients,
consumers, individual inventors and authors, as well as multinational technology companies. Her
practice includes intellectual property law, international law, and healthcare law.
1. Glenn Kessler, Just About Everything You’ve Read on the Warren DNA Test Is Wrong, WASH.
POST (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/18/just-about-everything-youve
-read-warren-dna-test-is-wrong.
2. Id.
3. The tribes consider DNA as an inseparable part of a person. Charles Petit, Trying to Study
Tribes While Respecting Their Cultures / Hopi Indian Geneticist Can See Both Sides, SFGATE (Feb. 19,
1998), https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Trying-to-Study-Tribes-While-Respecting-Their-3012825.p
hp.; Astead W. Herndon, Elizabeth Warren Apologizes to Cherokee Nation for DNA Test, N. Y. TIMES
(Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-cherokee-dna.html.
4. See Herndon, supra note 3.
5. See Kessler, supra note 1.
6. See infra Background: Tomorrow is a Mystery [hereinafter Background].
7. Amy L. McGuire & Laura M. Beskow, Informed Consent in Genomics and Genetic Research,
11 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 361, 362 (2010).
8. See infra Background Section B.
9. McGuire & Beskow, supra note 7, at 362.
10. See infra Background Section B.
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Inasmuch as genetic/genomic technologies have gained importance,
concerns over the misuse of sensitive information have grown.11 PCR
(genetic) testing has become a routine practice for the protection of human
lives from COVID-19 infection; however, it has also created the problem of
stigmatization, privacy, and profiling.12 The Cherokee Nation’s reaction to
the senator’s test announcement indicates that a person’s DNA test might
affect the solitude of another person or a well-defined population.13
Not so long ago, scientists at Arizona State University (ASU) conducted
unconsented genetic research on the Havasupai Tribe (ASU Incident).14 The
researchers used the samples for a migration study and later published the
results without specific permission.15 To the Havasupai Tribe, it was not
simply an unauthorized disclosure of personal information, but it
approximated the destruction of their legacy.16 The incident gave rise to a
million-dollar lawsuit against ASU.17
In spite of the lessons learned from the ASU Incident, it is becoming
common to use genetic/genomic information beyond the originally disclosed
purposes.18 From the perspective of participants’ privacy and autonomy, the
ASU Incident is a great illustration of why genetic/genomic information
presents such a challenging issue—the highly-exploitable and unlimited
nature of use, the identifiability of a tissue donor, and the multiplicity of

11. See infra Background Section C.
12. See FBI Investigating COVIDA-19 Data Breach in South Dakota, AP NEWS (Aug. 21, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/cfdfc0b77303664b165faf4866887612; see also PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR
THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, PRIVACY AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING 24-25
(Oct. 2012) [hereinafter PRIVACY AND PROGRESS]; McGuire & Beskow, supra note 7, at 367.
13. The Cherokee Nation does not determine its race by reference to DNA testing. Herndon, supra
note 3.
14. The university researchers also collected samples from the Havasupai Tribe for a study of
diabetes and used the samples to study their ancestry. Robyn L. Sterling, Genetic Research among the
Havasupai: A Cautionary Tale, 13 AM. MED. ASS’N. J. ETHICS 113 (2011). See also Nanibaa’ A.
Garrison, Genomic Justice for Native Americans: Impact of the Havasupai Case on Genetic Research, 38
SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES. 201 (2013); Kristof Van Assche et al., Protecting Dignitary Interests of
Biobank Research Participants: Lessons from Havasupai Tribe v Arizona Board of Regents, 5 L.
INNOVATION & TECH. 55 (2013).
15. Sterling, supra note 14, at 115.
16. See infra Argument: Quasi-property Right as Non-Common Privacy Interest [hereinafter
Argument] Section C. 2.
17. See id.
18. McGuire & Beskow, supra note 7, at 373.
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interested parties.19 Aggrieved participants may initiate privacy tort actions.20
However, it is hard to prevail in tort-based actions or resolve grievances
through existing mechanisms.21
Previously published articles have outlined ethical, legal, and social
issues involving the collection and use of genetic/genomic data and have
indicated that there is no one-size-fits-all approach.22 Among the proposed
solutions against the offensive use of genetic/genomic information is the
introduction of property concepts to provide recourse for tissue donors.23 The
merit of the property theory has been recognized; however, it has not been
accepted by courts.24
This paper identifies barriers to privacy tort actions and property theory,
and demonstrates why quasi-property rights, which protect privacy regarding
human remains and reproductive tissues, should be projected into the world
of genetics/genomics.25 The merit of quasi-property is explained as well as
its limitations.26
Background briefly describes the evolution of genetics and genomics and
the distinctive characteristics of genetic/genomic research.27 It describes why
genetic/genomic information has been treated as a distinctive group of
information.28 Argument then delineates the developing concept of privacy,
bridging from torts to the Constitution.29 It overviews tissue donors’ interest
in genetic/genomic information and shows that the risk of injury is intensified

19. See McGuire & Beskow, supra note 7, at 367; Privacy and Progress, supra note 12, at 83;
Jessica L. Roberts, Progressive Genetic Ownership, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1105, 1130-31, 1169 (2018).
Genetic/genomic information includes any data or information that describes genetic/genomic structures
or sequences about individuals. It includes raw data of DNA and RNA analysis, the measurements of
molecular markers, clinical observations about conditions caused by gene/genome irregularities.
See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A) (2012). See
also 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(c) (2014). Given the ability to re-identify test subjects, protectable
genetic/genomic information should include information which is re-identifiable using current and future
technologies.
20. Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS:
PROTECTING PRIVACY
AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 33-34 (Mark A. Rothstein ed. 1997).
21. Van Assche et al., supra note 14, at 75.
22. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 158 (1967); Allen, supra note 20, at 3334.
23. See Roberts, supra note 19, at 1105, 1107 (discussing problems of viewing genetic ownership
through a neoclassical law and economics lens); Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 723 (1999).
24. See infra Argument Section B; see also Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property:
Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 746, 809 (2004).
25. The quasi-property right is recognized for human tissues. See infra Argument Section B.
26. See infra Argument Section B.
27. See infra Background.
28. See id.
29. See infra Argument Section A.
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among vulnerable minority groups.30 Classic quasi-property—the ability to
control remains of relatives—is explained, as well as its applicability to
genetic/genomic information.31 The application of quasi-property to
hypotheticals shows that quasi-property captures the nexus of
genetic/genomic information and tissue donors’ dignity and autonomy,
offering a balanced resolution.32
BACKGROUND: TOMORROW IS A MYSTERY
Genetic/genomic information is characterized by several features,
including its multiplicity, identifiability, and commonality.33 This part
demonstrates that genetic/genomic information has unparalleled significance
to privacy protection because of the foregoing characteristics.34
A.

History of “Disfavored” Citizens: Risk of Stigmatization

Human traits such as eye colors are inheritable.35 Inheritance begins
when a child receives half of each parent’s genes, including those which
determine eye color.36 Modern genetics evolved after centuries of pursuing
the substance behind human inheritance.37
Genetics has produced
technological breakthroughs and answered previously unanswerable
questions.38
Ironically, modern genetics was more of a curse than blessing to people
with certain conditions.39 In the late nineteenth century, prominent scholars
advanced the position that human behaviors are programmed by the gene.40

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See infra Argument Section B (discussing the basis of broad consent and its problems).
See id.
See id.
See discussion infra Background Sections B, C.
See infra Background Sections B-D.
See generally Gregor Mendel, Experiments in Plant Hybridization, 4 VERHANDLUNGEN DES
NATURFORSCHENDEN VEREINES IN BRÜNN 3 (1866); Harrison R. Hunt, Intelligence as a Mendelian
Character: A Suggestion Concerning the Mode of Inheritance of Mental Ability, 17 J. HEREDITY 53
(1926).
36. Garland E. Allen, The Social and Economic Origins of Genetic Determinism: A Case History
of the American Eugenics Movement, 1900-1940 and Its Lessons for Today, 99 GENETICA 77 (1997);
Roberts, supra note 19, at 1122; Christopher P. Austin, Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA), NAT’L HUM.
GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/genetics-glossary/Deoxyribonucleic-Acid (last visited Jan.
31, 2021).
37. Each person’s body is made up of cells containing forty-six (46) chromosomes. The twentythree (23) pairs of chromosomes are about 3 billion base pairs long and contain around 30,000 genes.
Privacy and Progress, supra note 12, at 109-11; Austin, supra note 36.
38. Allen, supra note 20, at 40.
39. Scientific advancements do not always create happiness to mankind. Thomas H. Huxley,
Science and Culture, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 1620 (3d ed. 1974).
40. Francis Galton, a statistician and a sociologist, defined eugenics as a branch of study “which
deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race.” See Allen, supra note 36, at 78; See
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Genetic determinists argued that social problems should be preventable by
eliminating the succession of “undesirable” genes.41 Classic eugenics
developed from genetic determinism and forced racial hygiene in Germany.42
Nazis sterilized groups of individuals under the 1934 German Act.43 Fears of
pseudoscience persist even today.44
B. Multiplicity of Interest
While the term “genetic” may evoke deep-seated sentiments among
certain groups of people, newly developed technologies are rendering it a
purely technical term.45 Beginning with Watson and Crick’s seminal
discovery, research has explored structures no greater than a nanometer.46
Biologists have studied delicately controlled molecular cascades to conclude
that epigenetic modulations (changes external to genes) can cause genomewide alterations and serious medical conditions.47 Many of the new findings
are commonly found among patients with similar conditions.48 Illnesses that
were thought to be inheritable have been re-categorized as multifactorial from
“congenital.”49
The speed of today’s analytics is thousands of times faster than the
Human Genome Project’s.50 Whole genome sequencing is reportedly
completed in one day.51 At the same time, human genome researchers are
generating a staggering volume of data.52 In favor of the improved analytical
power, leading research institutions have consolidated their data to establish
also C. P. Blacker, “Eugenic” Experiments Conducted by the Nazis on Human Subjects, 44 Eugenics Rev.
9, 10 (1952).
41. Charles B. Davenport, Crime, Heredity, and Environment, 19 J. HEREDITY 307 (1928).
42. See Blacker, supra note 40, at 10 (stating that eugenics is a merciful creed and Nazi racist
practices were different from eugenics); see Allen, supra note 36, at 77.
43. Eugenics was successful in the United States, Britain, and Germany. Allen, supra note 36, at
77, 85.
44. Allen, supra note 36, at 78.
45. The term “genetic” has been used to mean “inheritable” or “familial.” Roberts, supra note 19,
at 1122.
46. DNA is the substance that is used as a code in each gene. Human genome contains two strings
of (double-stranded) DNAs that are approximately three-billion base long. The itinerary of our life-long
biological development is written as sequences of DNAs in genome. J. D. Watson & F. H. C. Crick,
Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids, 171 NATURE 737 (1953).
47. See Xinchen Wang et al., High-resolution Genome-wide Functional Dissection of
Transcriptional Regulatory Regions and Nucleotides in Human, 9 NATURE COMMS. 5380 (2018).
48. Cleft Lip and Cleft Palate, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/cle
ft-palate/symptoms-causes/syc-20370985 (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
49. See supra note 48; William A. Eimer et al., Alzheimer’s Disease-Associated β-Amyloid Is
Rapidly Seeded by Herpesviridae to Protect Against Brain Infection, 99 NEURON 56 (2018).
50. The Human Genome Project was launched in 1990 to perform sequencing of the human
genome. It took more than twelve years to complete the project. The Human Genome Project, NAT’L
HUM. GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/human-genome-project (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
51. BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 533-34 (4th ed. 2002).
52. McGuire & Beskow, supra note 7, at 366.
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“biobanks” and have correlated genetic/genomic data with health information
of research participants.53
In addition to freely accessible biobanks, there are proprietary databases
that charge a fee to access their information.54 The market value of big genetic
databases is estimated to reach as much as millions of dollars.55
C. Identifiability and Commonality
Genetic/genomic materials are rarely disconnected from hosts.56 DNA
fingerprinting technology links a small amount of tissue left at a crime scene
to a perpetrator as DNA fingerprints are analyzed and give a match in a
database.57 Thus, even when the name of a person is removed from a
biological sample, DNA fingerprints buried in samples reveal the person’s
identity.58 In fact, a cheek swab usually contains enough DNA fingerprints
to identify its source.59 Only when a negligible quantity of DNA fingerprints
exist or genetic/genomic information is too small to disclose the identity of
its donor is such a sample or information de-identified.60 Therefore, the
anonymity of genetic/genomic data is rarely achievable.61

53. Vanderbilt University and Northwestern University have linked their biobanks to electronic
health records to uncover genotype-phenotype associations. See Lori B. Andrews, Harnessing the Benefits
of Biobanks, 33 J. L. MED. ETHICS, 22, 22-23 (2005); Catherine A. McCarty et al., The eMERGE Network:
A Consortium of Biorepositories Linked to Electronic Medical Records Data for Conducting Genomic
Studies, 4 BMC MED. GENOMICS 13 (2011).
54. Jorge L. Contreras, The False Promise of Health Data Ownership, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 630
(2019).
55. See Contreras, supra note 54 (global health data valued at $100 billion per year); Matthew
Herper, Surprise! With $60 Million Genentech Deal, 23andMe Has a Business Plan, FORBES, (Jan. 6,
2015, 9:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2015/01/06/surprise-with-60-million-gene
ntech-deal-23andme-has-a-business-plan/#3913bcbb2be9 (“The deal is the first of ten 23andMe says it
has signed with large pharmaceutical and biotech companies.”); Joseph N. DiStefano, Test Results: Glaxo
Pays 23andMe $300M, Will Use 4 Million Customers’ Genetic Data, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 25, 2018),
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/blogs/inq-phillydeals/test-results-23andme-sells-4-million-customersgenetic-data-to-glaxo-for-300m-20180725.html.
56. Van Assche et al., supra note 14, at 69.
57. See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT’L ACADEMY OF
SCIS., DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 155 (1992); S. Panneerchelvam & M. N. Norazmi,
Forensic DNA Profiling and Database, 10 MALAY. J. MED. SCI. 20 (2003).
58. Erika Check Hayden, The Genome Hacker, Yaniv Erlich Shows How Research Participants
Can Be Identified from ‘Anonymous’ DNA, 497 NATURE 172 (May 09, 2013).
59. See Jessica G. Woo et al., Quality Assessment of Buccal Versus Blood Genomic DNA Using
the Affymetrix 500 K GeneChip, 8 BMC GENETICS 79 (2007); see generally Chao-Tien Chang, Bank on
We the People: Why and How Public Engagement Is Relevant to Biobanking, 25 MICH. TECH. L. REV.
239 (2019) (discussing de-identified biospecimens).
60. C. Heeney et al., Assessing the Privacy Risks of Data Sharing in Genomics, 14 PUB. HEALTH
GENOMICS 17 (2010).
61. Harald Schmidt & Shawneequa Callier, How Anonymous Is ‘Anonymous’? Some Suggestions
Towards a Coherent Universal Coding System for Genetic Samples, 38 J. MED. ETHICS 304 (2012).
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Further, re-identifying a tissue donor is increasingly possible thanks to
emerging investigative techniques.62 Advanced data analytics can help
investigators discover the identity of a tissue donor or a tissue donor’s family
based on gathered data.63 The identity of a donor is even consciously kept
for the purpose of returning important test results to the donor.64
Along with identity-revealing short DNA sequences, DNA sequences
contain clues for a host’s health status.65 To address concerns for genetic
prejudice, legislative bodies have enacted genetic/genomic-specific laws.66
In terms of the DNA fingerprints, the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination
Act of 2000 (“the DNA Act”), further supported by The Debbie Smith DNA
Backlog Grant Program, prohibits access except specifically allowed.67
Professor Scherr wrote that “[i]nformation from DNA analysis can be
intimate, personal, shared, predictive, and powerful.”68 Privacy concerns are
underscored in genetic research because obtained information could suggest
a person’s serious health condition, or evidence that a person comes from a
particular ethnic group.69 It may also be used in making marriage decisions
and childbearing choices.70 The disclosure of these types of information
affects the tissue donor’s family relationships, life plans, and even social or
economic status.71

62. Id. at 305.
63. Anonymized data can later be integrated with other data. PRIVACY AND PROGRESS, supra note
12, at 64.
64. The American College of Medical Genetics recommends using DNA genotyping tests to track
the identity of the donor of the sample. Robert C. Green et al., ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of
Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS IN MED. 565 (2017).
65. See Shoko Kawamoto, et al., Expression Profiling by iAFLP: A PCR-Based Method for
Genome-Wide Gene Expression Profiling, 9 GENOME RES. 1305 (1999); Mark Schena, et al, Parallel
human genome analysis: microarray-based expression monitoring of 1000 genes, 93 PROC. OF NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 10614 (1996); Dieter Holger, Best DNA Testing Kits: Discover the Secrets Stored in Your
Genes, PCWORLD, https://www.pcworld.com/article/3317567/best-dna-kits.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2021); PRIVACY AND PROGRESS, supra note 12, at 25.
66. See Mark A. Rothstein, Health Privacy in the Electronic Age, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 487, 495
(2007); Allen, supra note 23, at 724; PRIVACY AND PROGRESS, supra note 12, at 66-67.
67. DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135, transferred to 34 U.S.C. § 40706); The Debbie Smith DNA
Backlog Grant Program, 34 U.S.C. § 40701 (2019) (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C. § 14135).
68. Albert E. Scherr, Genetic Privacy & the Fourth Amendment: Unregulated Surreptitious DNA
Harvesting, 47 GA. L. REV. 445, 492 (2013).
69. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (privacy protection under the Fourth
Amendment); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive’s Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (“analysis of urine,
like that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts . . . including whether he or she is epileptic,
pregnant, or diabetic”); Garrison, supra note 14, at 217.
70. Erik Lief, DNA-Based Dating Using ‘Attraction’ Genes Attracts Questions, AM. COUNCIL SCI.
HEALTH (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.acsh.org/news/2018/02/03/dna-based-dating-using-attraction-genesattracts-questions-12516.
71. PRIVACY AND PROGRESS, supra note 12, at 24-25.
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Also, genetic/genomic information includes elements shared with
others.72 Around 99.9% of the human genome is identical.73 The
commonality is advantageous in that genetic/genomic information is
generalizable and can pave a way to life-saving treatments for many.74 The
commonality explains why tissues are donated for genetic/genomic
research.75
However, the commonality may harm individual privacy.76 Since a
person’s genetic abnormality can be shared amongst his or her kindreds, a
test result may cause an unexpected issue to individuals biologically related
to the tested person.77 As seen in Senator Warren’s DNA testing, the
disclosure of one person’s test result may cause disruption to another’s public
reputation and cultural and personal values, if the genetic/genomic similarity
is expected to be high.78
D. Summary
Overall, genetic/genomic information is a special class of information
with remarkable characteristics: multiplicity, identifiability, and
commonality.79
Numerous tissue donations make up valuable
genetic/genomic information.80 The commonality is beneficial in biomedical
research and development but is associated with privacy ripple effects.81

72. Genetics vs. Genomics Fact Sheet, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. PROJECT (Sept. 7, 2018),
https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Genetics-vs-Genomics.
73. Id.
74. What is the Human Genome Project?, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. PROJECT (October 28, 2018),
https://www.genome.gov/human-genome-project/What.
75. Human genetic pool can be considered as semicommons property. See Henry E. Smith,
Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131-32 (2000);
Ken Gatter, Biobanks as a Tissue and Information Semicommons: Balancing Interests for Personalized
Medicine, Tissue Donors and the Public Health, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 303, 335-36 (2012).
76. Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 767, 782-84 (1999).
77. A child’s DNA test can provide DNA evidence of the child’s parent’s crime. See Alice A.
Noble, DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 149, 150 (2006) (components
shared among a kinship group or a small population); Hibbert, supra note 76, at 782-84 (describing an
arrest of a family member of a suspect from a DNA sample); Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden
State Killer Is Tracked Through a Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-genealogy.html.
78. Findings obtained from genetic/genomic studies are relevant to many whether results are good
or bad. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text for a description of Senator Warren’s DNA test
incident.
79. See infra Background Sections B, C.
80. Panneerchelvam & Norazmi, supra note 57, at 20.
81. Hibbert, supra note 76, at 767, 791, 793-94 (DNA banks can be utilized to garner health and
other information about the tested person, as well as his or her relatives); Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra
Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67
BROOKLYN L. REV. 127, 164 n.216 (2001).
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Minority groups and patients with rare conditions are at higher risk of privacy
invasion.82
ARGUMENT: QUASI-PROPERTY RIGHT AS NON-COMMON PRIVACY
INTEREST
After different approaches and mechanisms are overviewed, Argument
shows that quasi-property rights must be considered to reinforce missed
privacy protection for genetic/genomic information without overburdening
important biomedical research.83
A. Privacy in Human Tissues and Biomedical Information
1. The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy guarantees freedom to be left alone.84 The concept
of privacy dates back to Brandeis and Warren’s paper that called attention to
the media’s encroachment upon privacy.85 Brandeis and Warren found a
copyright case in English literature,86 and introduced the right of privacy into
U.S. common law.87
Later, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that every man is entitled
to enjoy the right to privacy, whether within or outside of society.88 The
Georgia court’s approach was followed by other courts.89 The Supreme Court
82. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., AN EXAMINATION OF EMERGING BIOETHICAL ISSUES
IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH at 56 (2020) (highlighting the American Indian/Alaskan Native population’s
higher risk of identification and stigmatization).
83. See infra Argument Sections A, B, C, D, and E.
84. In the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the following classes of privacy invasions are described
as judicially recognized: “(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, . . . (b) appropriation
of the other’s name or likeness, . . . (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, . . . or (d)
publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652A (1977); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (categories of
privacy torts).
85. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 19596 (1890); James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, the Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890):
Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 875, 883 (1979); Neil M. Richards &
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 128-29
(2007).
86. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 85, at 208-09.
87. The right to privacy has been widely accepted in most states. See Anderson v. Romero, 72
F.3d 518, 521-22 (7th Cir. 1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977); STUART M. SPEISER
ET AL., 9 AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 30:1 (Monique C. M. Leahy ed., 2021); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy
in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327-28 (1966);
Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions
in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 999 (1995).
88. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905); Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 85, at 198 (Roman law provides a remedy for unjust violations of one’s honor).
89. See People ex rel. Gow v. Bingham, 107 N.Y.S. 1011, 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1907) (“the right to
preserve his person inviolate from attack by any other person”); Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky.
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of Indiana held that “[t]he [r]ight of [p]rivacy . . . [is] derived from natural
law and guaranteed by both the Federal and State Constitutions. As between
man and man it must be respected.” 90 Two layers of privacy have been
developed: informational and decisional.91 Informational privacy prevents
unwanted disclosure of another’s private facts and preserves his or her
dignity.92 Decisional privacy guarantees one’s liberty to make important life
decisions.93
Among the causes of action that fall within informational privacy,
intrusion upon seclusion provides the most relevant framework for the
collection of genetic/genomic information and its use.94 In the majority of
jurisdictions, intrusion upon seclusion requires facts supporting the following
elements: (1) intrusion, usually achieved by watching, spying, prying,
overhearing, or other similar conduct;95 (2) concerning the “solitude or
seclusion of another or his [or her] private affairs . . . [; (3)] highly offensive
to a reasonable person”; and (4) a defendant’s intentional act.96 Another
category, publication of private facts, has similar elements.97 Whether a
defendant’s intrusion is highly offensive depends upon circumstances: the
“likelihood of serious harm to the victim[s],” the manner of intrusion, “the
intruder’s motives,” and the existence of “countervailing interests.”98
The identifiability of a privacy victim is located at the intersection of
privacy law and privacy regulations.99 The disclosure of identity is treated as
an important fact to claims based on publication of private facts.100 On the
other hand, it is not settled whether the victim’s identity is essential in
establishing an intrusion upon seclusion claim.101 When an employer’s
1931); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 106 N.E.2d 742, 743, 748 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952); Pritchett v. Bd. of
Comm’rs of Knox Cty., 85 N.E. 32, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1908).
90. See Voelker v. Tyndall, 75 N.E.2d 548, 549 (Ind. 1947).
91. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). See supra note 84 (for four categories of privacy
torts).
92. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600; Jay P. Kesan et al., Information Privacy and Data Control
in Cloud Computing: Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market Efficiency, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
341, 384-86 (2013).
93. Individuals are “left to shape [their] own life as [they] think[] best, do what [they] please[], go
where [they] please[].” Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)).
94. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
95. Snakenberg v. Hartfoed Casualty Ins. Co., 299 S.C. 164, 171, 388 S.E.2d 2 (1989).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
98. Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589, 606 (9th
Cir. 2020).
99. See WESTIN, supra note 22, at 69 (“[T]he ability to move about anonymously”); Tom Gerety,
Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 282, 284, 288, 291 (1977).
100. See Floa. Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 537 (1989); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93-94 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (finding privacy invasion by a filmmaker when the plaintiff’s true name was
disclosed).
101. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 293-295 (3d Cir. 2016).
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access to employees’ email communications is sought to be banned, the
probability of identifying an employee is considered pertinent.102 Also, a
sperm donor’s attempt to ascertain his biological child may disrupt another’s
seclusion.103 These examples indicate that when a subject’s identity is easily
ascertainable, the degree of privacy disruption is more significant.
Nevertheless, the expectation of privacy and the expectation of
anonymity are two distinctive concepts.104 The Third Circuit permitted a
plaintiff’s intrusion into seclusion claim without inquiring whether the
defendant collected and disclosed information containing personal
identifiers.105 The Third Circuit’s opinion supports the view that the victim’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, rather than the identifiability of the victim,
is a key question.106
Assuming a prima facie case of privacy invasion, a defendant may argue
that the plaintiff’s consent eliminates tort liability.107 Since a plaintiff’s
consent to a defendant justifies the defendant’s privacy invasion, the issue of
consent is a key question for a privacy plaintiff.108
The second type of privacy—decisional privacy—originates from Justice
Cardozo’s opinion that endorsed the right to control one’s bodily integrity in
medical procedures.109 The respect for autonomy has developed into the
mandate of informed consent, compelling a provider’s disclosure of
information before obtaining consent.110 Informed consent was established
on the view that each individual has a different set of personal values and
perspective, and the disclosure of important facts is necessary for an
individual to make a choice.111
102. George R. Lucas, Jr., Privacy, Anonymity, and Cyber Security, 5 AMSTERDAM L. F. 107, 109,
111, 113 (2013) (observing the problem of equating anonymity with privacy).
103. Lucy R. Dollens, Artificial Insemination: Right of Privacy and the Difficulty in Maintaining
Donor Anonymity, 35 IND. L. REV. 213, 236-37 (2001).
104. Anonymity is indirectly protected by data protection law. Jeffrey M. Skopek, Reasonable
Expectations of Anonymity, 101 VA. L. REV. 691, 717-18, 758 (2015).
105. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 293-95 (3d Cir. 2016) (denying a
Video Privacy Protection Act violation claim for lack of personally identifiable information and sustaining
intrusion upon seclusion when an internet advertising company disregarded its promise not to collect
personal information from children).
106. Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 292, 294. The presence of identity-revealing elements may not be
strictly required in certain privacy torts. See infra Argument Section B.
107. Consent is a defense to intentional torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1979).
See also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (written consent); CHRISTINE RIEFA ET AL., 1 LAW OF THE INTERNET § 2.06
(2020).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1979).
109. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”).
110. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1957); Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990); RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 7 (1986).
111. See In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70, 72 (N.Y. 1981); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 271, 286-87 (1990) (confirming a right to refuse medical treatment) (citing Superintendent of
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts relied on the rights of
privacy and informed consent to recognize substituted consent for
withholding chemotherapy.112 The principle of informed consent has
encompassed non-therapeutic human research given that there can be a
serious risk of bodily injury as well as harm to the personal values and beliefs
of participants.113 The distinction of investigator-participant relationship
from doctor-patient relationship is not dispositive to the duty of informed
consent.114
In sum, the right to privacy guarantees one’s freedom to live with dignity
and autonomy.115 Informational privacy actions, such as claims based on
invasion into seclusion, often fail to offer effective solutions.116 In contrast,
decisional privacy has been playing a more important role.117 The informed
consent claim by a research participant who suffered a serious adverse effect
has been sustained.118
2. Constitutional Developments
The constitutional right of privacy primarily guarantees every
individual’s “possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law.”119 This includes a person’s bodily integrity, freedom to have a family
and procreate, a right to abort, liberty to have an intimate relationship, and a
right to personal dignity.120 In the area of genetic privacy, the Supreme Court
has indicated that unauthorized use of genetic/genomic information
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977)). See also FADEN &
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 110, at 7; Douglas S. T. Green & C. Ronald MacKenzie, Nuances of Informed
Consent: The Paradigm of Regional Anesthesia, 3 HOSP. SPECIAL SURGERY J. 115, 115 (2007).
112. The court reasoned that the value of human dignity extends to incompetent persons. Saikewicz,
370 N.E.2d at 419, 424, 427, 435.
113. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 812-13, 844 (Md. 2001) (duty to
inform children’s risk of irreversible injuries); Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1471
(M.D.N.C. 1986) (the higher level of risk disclosure applicable to non-therapeutic experimentation);
Valerie Gutmann Koch, A Private Right of Action for Informed Consent in Research, 45 SETON HALL L.
REV. 173, 183 (2015) (recognizing the underdeveloped right of informed consent in research); Clarissa
Allen et al., Data Sharing, Biobanks and Informed Consent: A Research Paradox?, 7 MCGILL J.L. &
HEALTH 85, 105-06 (2013) (Canada’s strict informed consent requirements and broad consent). But see
Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1291, 1296 (W.D. Wash. 2002)
(denying the informed consent cause of action).
114. Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
115. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 424; FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 110, at 7.
116. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
118. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 812, 819, 824-26, 844, 858.
119. See Union P. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1891).
120. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600.; Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human
Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 360 n.2, 399 (2000) (explaining that the constitutional right of privacy is
synonymous with personal autonomy).
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constitutes a threat to a tissue owner’s dignity under the Fourth
Amendment.121
The Constitution guarantees one’s freedom to have a family, engage in
sexual conducts, and manage other reproductive matters.122 Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, “liberty” should include so-called decisional privacy
to embrace a person’s freedom to use and control genetic/genomic
information; as the use and control is indispensable to the person’s seminal
decisions in life and as vital as those aforementioned.123 The second category
of privacy, informational privacy, bolsters a person’s right to control
information.124 Justice Brennan explained that an “individual’s interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters is an aspect of the right of privacy”
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.125 The constitutional footings of
informational privacy have been found in the First Amendment, the Third
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment.126
Moreover, informational privacy supplements a person’s decisional privacy
in the matters involving “the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.”127 The

121. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (privacy protection under the Fourth Amendment); Skinner,
489 U.S. at 616-18. (“analysis of urine, [or] blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an
[individual], including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.”); U.S. v. Navarro-Gonzalez,
No. 12-CR-158-A, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99287, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. July 12, 2013) (quoting Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 767).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. The Supreme Court has afforded protection for decisional
privacy. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (liberty to educate one’s children); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (liberty to learn foreign languages); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (right of procreation); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy of the marital
relation); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(liberty to use contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978) (a right to marry); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (homosexual conducts); U.S.
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (same sex marriage); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (same
sex marriage).
123. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494, (1980) (liberty to resist transfer to mental hospital and
mandatory behavior modification treatment); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600, (1979) (liberty interest
in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277-78 (1990) (confirming
the right to refuse medical treatment); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-11,
at 1365 (2d ed. 1988) (the constitutional privacy right in addition to common law right to refuse medical
treatment).
124. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-99.
125. “Personal matters” are inclusive of the person’s reputation and dignity, such as criminal record.
See Whalen, 429 U.S. 593, 606 (Brennan, J., concurring) (a statute requiring disclosure of the identity of
a person seeking prescription of controlled substances); U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of Press 489 U.S. 749, 778-80 (1989).
126. See, e.g., Katz v. U.S , 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (listing constitutional provisions for
privacy) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958);
Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966)).
127. One’s liberty to control information related to personal matters makes whole “the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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two components of privacy merge and guarantee a right of genetic/genomic
integrity.
3. The Right to Privacy in Genetic/Genomic Research
Do participants in genetic/genomic studies have a tort claim arising from
unconsented use of genetic/genomic information? As noted earlier,
genetic/genomic information is a special class of information: the heightened
risk of stigmatization against minority groups; the identifiability of subjects;
and genetic/genomic commonality.128 In consideration of these features,
many of us would think that unauthorized use of genetic/genomic data should
constitute an intrusion upon seclusion.129
More unclear is whether a consent form, signed by a participant, can
successfully protect researchers. Even with evidence of consent, researchers
may still be found liable because consent is only effective within certain
limits and conditions that accompany it.130 Anything that goes beyond what
consent was specifically given for, may create a cause of action for future
disputes.131 Furthermore, the validity of consent is also contestable.132 A
participant can argue that the researchers misled them or failed to inform them
of the serious risks involved in the study.
Informed consent claims protect research participants from unconsented
disclosure of exceptionally important information both informational privacy
and decisional privacy derived.133 As the Havasupai Tribe experienced, what
can be gleaned from a sample is shocking to those participants who have
never been informed on the privacy implication of invasive study findings.134

128. Unique characteristics of genetic/genomic information. See infra Background.
129. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying texts. (1) A genetic analysis and use of results can
constitute intrusion because it is equivalent to prying into someone’s sensitive health information. (2) It
also concerns the solitude or seclusion of another, or his or her private affairs, when obtained data contains
or shows a test subject’s identity and the analysis reveals matters usually kept secret (a person’s
gene/genome constitute). (3) Unauthorized use of genetic information is often highly offensive to a
reasonable person, depending on the nature, manner, and purpose of the use and analysis. (4) Use and
analysis of data is usually intentional.
130. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 124-125 (1990).
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 892, 892A, 892B (1977); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235, 248 (1973) (voluntariness of consent).
132. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 366 Md. 29, 98 (2001).
133. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600.
134. See Participating in Genomics Research, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST. (Jan. 10,
2018) [hereinafter Participating], https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/policy-issues/Human-Subjec
ts-Research-in-Genomics/Participating-in-Research;
Polakit
Teekakirikul
et
al.,
Inherited
cardiomyopathies: molecular genetics and clinical genetic testing in the postgenomic era 15, THE
JOURNAL OF MOLECULAR GENETICS 158, 166 (2013); Jasmin Wertz et al., Genetics and Crime:
Integrating New Genomic Discoveries Into Psychological Research About Antisocial Behavior, 29
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 791 (2018); Holger, supra note 65.
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The requirement of informed consent is designed to prevent privacy victims’
suffering.135
Fact finders should consider both informational and decisional privacy
harms if biological samples obtained under broad consent are used for
intrusive studies when participants were not fully informed. Provided that
participants were informed of the possibility of future genetic research,
“broad” consent to genetic studies is nominally present.136 Nevertheless, with
regard to informational privacy, issues related to the scope and validity of
consent remain; additional genetic/genomic studies may have a distinct
impact upon participants’ enjoyment of intimate matters because their dignity
rests upon being fully informed.137 This would apply equally to decisional
privacy when participants are deprived of information to truly understand
what is at stake.138 In view of the significance of the risk of stigmatization
and the absence of appreciation of such significance by average participants,
consent may not be found when it is difficult to anticipate the intrusiveness
of additional studies at the moment broad consent is given.139
In addition to privacy tort claims and informed consent claims,
constitutional remedies may be available when the government is involved in
the unauthorized use or collection of genetic/genomic data.140 First, freedom
to access and use a critical piece of one’s genetic information presents lifedefining choices in connection with decisional privacy; genetic/genomic
testing would be essential to the parents who lost a child to an incurable
condition caused by a genetic mutation.141 The parents usually decide to
receive a genetic examination to understand the probability of disease
succession to prevent another loss of a child.142 Genetic/genomic testing
provides a scientific evaluation and assists family planning and management
and prevention of serious conditions.143 Because of its centrality to the
135. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 143-44, 147.
136. Christine Grady et al., Broad Consent For Research With Biological Samples: Workshop
Conclusions, 15(9) AM. J. BIOETH. 34, 38 (2015).
137. Participating, supra note 134; Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
138. National Human Genome Research Institute considers that participants’ primary objective to
is altruistic and the Common Rule and other regulations will protect privacy. Participating, supra note
134 (“The main reason to participate is to advance science, so make sure you know what the study is
designed to investigate and that it’s something you want to help support.”).
139. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1268-70 (9th Cir. 1998) (“One
can think of few subject areas more personal and more likely to implicate privacy interests than that of
one’s health or genetic make-up.”).
140. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 464 (2013);
Phillip B. Kurland, The private I, 69, No. 1 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO MAGAZINE 7, 8 (1976).
141. Beth A. Pletcher et al., Indications for genetic referral: a guide for healthcare providers, in 9
GENETICS IN MEDICINE, 385–89 (2007) (listing conditions indicated for genetic consultation and further
testing).
142. See PRIVACY AND PROGRESS, supra note 12, at 22.
143. See PRIVACY AND PROGRESS, supra note 12, at 114; Pletcher, supra note 141.
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enjoyment of life, freedom to utilize genetic testing should lie within the
sanctuary of the Fourteenth Amendment.144
Similarly, the Constitution should also guarantee the liberty to avoid
unconsented genetic/genomic testing of sensitive matters if that the testing is
incompatible with one’s personal values and sense of self.145 Informational
privacy provides constitutional safeguards against the misuse of
genetic/genomic information.146 While the most common scenario is the
application of DNA fingerprinting in criminal investigations, informational
privacy protection is not limited to such use because of the nexus between
what is disclosed from the analysis of a person’s DNA and the possibility of
mistreatment against groups with certain backgrounds.147 The magnitude of
traceable information by authorities is incomparable to other types of data, as
is the gravity of the privacy injury that follows.148 For example, a number of
states formerly enforced compulsory sterilization against incarcerated people
and patients with mental conditions.149 The constitutional right of privacy is
opening a new pathway against a real menace to our genetic integrity.150
According to Navarro-Gonzalez, “the taking of buccal swabs from the
inside of the defendant’s mouth is properly viewed as implicating his dignity
interests.”151 With regard to the autonomy and dignity of research
participants, opinions indicate that research participants and patients may
claim a constitutional violation based on deceptive concealment of
foreseeable risks to study participation, which is an issue separate from the

144. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring).
145. Cruzan indicates that courts generally consider the invasiveness of procedure as a factor to
overcome state interest, but “the preservation of life, the protection of the interests of innocent third parties,
the prevention of suicide, and the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession” support
state interest. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271. The invasiveness inquiry should include injury to genetic integrity
since one’s genetic code may be inseparable from a person’s personal values. Supra notes 3, 4, 13 and
accompanying texts.
146. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (listing constitutional provisions for privacy) (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S.
at 462; Tehan, 382 U.S. at 416).
147. U.S. v. Navarro-Gonzalez, No. 12-CR-158-A, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99287, at *6-7
(W.D.N.Y. July 12, 2013) (viewing the DNA sample as implicating dignity interests of a tissue donor).
148. Genetic determinism and genetic discrimination persist until today. See infra Background
Section A.
149. People v. Barrett, 54 Cal. 4th 1081, 1121-25 (2012) (Liu, J., concurring and dissenting) (history
of eugenics in the United States).
150. Kurland, supra note 140, at 7-8.
151. See Navarro-Gonzalez, No. 12-CR-158-A, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99287, at *6. In contrast,
the standardized buccal swab collection and the registry of junk DNA segments at CODIS (criminal
database) from those charged with a violent crime was held not sensitive enough to affect the suspect’s
dignity. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447-48, 463, 465 (2013) (Reasoning that (a) minor physical
invasion, (b) no more than the identity-related analysis, (c) non-discretionary standard, (d) decreased
privacy expectation due to the presence of probable cause for a serious crime). But see King, 569 U.S. at
466 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the possibility of finding incriminating evidence through the
identification process).
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common law right to informed consent.152 Thus, a participant should be able
to seek a remedy for a privacy invasion and potentially for a constitutional
violation.
In response, study organizers and involved researchers may consider
making the following arguments. First, they may submit an argument that a
study was conducted based on an enormous number of samples for the
purpose of scientific discovery; therefore, it would not be a “highly offensive”
invasion.153 As previously described, genetic/genomic research is simply
carried out on multiple de-individualized samples whose donors’ privacy
should not be affected.154 Samples or extracted data are repeatedly used for
different studies.155 Thus, study findings are not expected to be ominous to a
particular individual.156 However, in the ASU Incident, the researchers
conducted an undisclosed inbreeding study and an immigration study, which
could have ruined the tribe’s sense of self and fractured the tribe’s
solidarity.157
Secondly, researchers may contend that there is no privacy invasion on
the ground that used samples and data are coded (de-identified).158 The
identifiability of a tissue donor alone is likely not determinative to the
outcome, as previously discussed.159 However, it is possible that the
plaintiff’s identifiability may be considered as a mitigating factor in certain
circumstances.160
Third, there are unresolved issues concerning the multiplicity of right
holders and the interdependence of privacy interests.161 The multiplicity of
interest may confound what remedy is available to a plaintiff. Even when a
plaintiff wishes to gain control over his or her genetic/genomic information,

152. See Heinrich v. Sweet, 62 F. Supp. 2d 282, 313 (Mass. 1999) (radiation experiments known to
have no therapeutic value); Stadt v. Univ. of Rochester, 921 F. Supp. 1023, 1025 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)
(injection of plutonium under the pretense of treatment); In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp.
796, 812 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (the radiation as a military experiment). But see Wright v. Fred Hutchinson
Cancer Research Ctr., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1295-96 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (denying the violation of the
Civil Rights Act claim).
153. Davis v. Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d 589, 606 (9th Cir. 2020).
154. Participating, supra note 134.
155. See supra Background Section B.
156. Participating, supra note 134.
157. See supra Introduction.
158. See infra note 214 and accompanying texts about the ASU’s use of coded samples, which the
researchers considered would resolve privacy issues.
159. See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying texts.
160. For example, when a study is conducted on diverse demographics by multiple institutions.
161. See supra Background Sections B, C for the discussion of the multiplicity, the identifiability,
and the commonality.
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the justification for granting exclusive control over the information is widely
debated.162
The discussions in Section B will illustrate why there are multiple
measures and different approaches that work in combination, and why quasiproperty is necessary for individuals whose privacy has been harmed in
genetic/genomic research.163
B. Enhancement of Privacy Rights
Technological advancements have not only created the law of
informational privacy as Warren and Brandeis had proposed, but they have
also anchored genetic/genomic information to a multifaceted right of
privacy.164 The following paragraphs overview self-regulatory efforts and
laws that have been put into practice and demonstrate that quasi-property is
the optimal modality to shield tissue donors’ genetic/genomic privacy.165
1. Informed Consent and Broad Consent in Genetic/Genomic
Research
U.S legislatures have not enacted laws which permit privacy victims to
seek information from or effective relief against infringing entities.166
Enhanced privacy protection has been viewed negatively because a single
donor’s autonomy will limit other stakeholders’ important interest in
research.167 Out of concern that “atomistic concept of autonomy” would
undermine medical developments, informed consent has been second to
scientific research.168
In federally funded research involving human subjects, the Federal Policy
for the Protection of Human Subjects Research (Common Rule) provides for
informed consent.169 The process of informed consent was designed to
162. To litigants who seek return of genetic information or those who seek return of study results,
typical privacy actions do not render an effective remedy. See infra Section B for cases where the court
denied relief requested by plaintiffs.
163. See infra Section B.
164. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying texts for the development of informational privacy;
Allen, supra note 20, at 34.
165. See infra Section B(1)-(7).
166. Generally, see supra Section A.3. and infra B.2. See also PRIVACY AND PROGRESS, supra note
12, at 65 (“these [foreign] laws differ from U.S. law, which is focused on prohibiting discrimination
resulting from disclosure of genetic information rather than ensuring privacy of genetic information);
Grady et al., supra note 136.
167. Barbara Evans, Power to the People: Data Citizens in the Age of Precision Medicine, 19 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 243, 258-259 (2016).
168. Evans, supra note 167 at 244-47; see also Erik Christensen, Biobanks and Our Common Good,
in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH BIOBANKING 101 (Jan Helge Solbakk et al., eds., 2009).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 241(d)(4) (2018). Because a right of informed consent is held to exist at common
law, the statute is codification of the right at common law to some extent. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271.
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augment tissue donors’ decisional privacy when a covered entity collects
subject-identifiable information.170 The informed consent requirement under
the Common Rule does not guarantee flawless privacy protection.171
As commonly known, there are exceptions to the informed consent
requirement: de-identified data; a participant who has given broad consent;
and research that involves only minimal risk.172 According to the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking by the Department of Health and Human
Services Office of Human Research Protections, samples may be used in
subsequent studies as long as a participant signs a standard consent form.173
The broad consent exception was introduced to further genetic/genomic
research because time and costs to obtain informed consent would be
prohibitive in large-scale genetic research.174 Broad consent has been
supported by a panel of bioethics experts,175 and several studies reported that
broad consent provides sufficient privacy protection.176
Conversely, other studies indicated that broad consent may curtail
participants’ autonomy.177 One study showed that a significant minority of
participants desired to be informed of the process and have tighter control
over their tissues.178 In another study, only seventy-eight percent (78%) of
the surveyed respondents indicated that they would agree to the use of their
tissues for additional purposes in the future.179 Further, significantly fewer
African American respondents answered that they would give consent to
170. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 124-25, 139-40.
171. Grady et al., supra note 136, at 8.
172. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.104(d), 46.116(d) (2018). The rule amended in 2017 greatly streamlined
informed consent processes for genetic/genomic research. Key information needs to be provided to
participants, such as risks and benefits of the study enrollment. See Revised Common Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF
HUMAN HEALTH AND SCI., https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/finalized-revisi
ons-common-rule/index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
173. See PRIVACY AND PROGRESS, supra note 12, at 91; Grady et al., supra note 136, at 2.
174. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and
Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44514-44516, 4452344524 (proposed Jul. 25, 2011). Another reason for providing an exception is the involvement of
negligible physical risks to donors and the existence of other regulations to protect privacy. 76 Fed. Reg.
44,512.
175. Jonathan S. Miller, Can I Call You Back? A Sustained Interaction with Biospecimen Donors to
Facilitate Advances in Research, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15, 17 (2015).
176. Grady et al., supra note 136, at 4-5 (“the majority of . . . their willingness to donate specimens
is not affected by the specific details of the future research, such as the disease being studied, the
technology used . . . the study target (genes or white cells), or the product (treatment or prevention).”).
177. Asa Kettis-Lindblad et al., Genetic research and donation of tissue samples to biobanks. What
do potential sample donors in the Swedish general public think?, EUR. J PUB. HEALTH, 2006 Aug, at 437;
Briana Mezuk et al., Participant Characteristics That Influence Consent for Genetic Research in a
Population-Based Survey: The Baltimore Epidemiologic Catchment Area Follow-Up, 11 CMTY.
GENETICS 171, 176-77 (2008); Christian M. Simon et al., Active Choice But Not Too Active: Public
Perspectives on Biobank Consent Models, 13 GENETICS IN MED. 821, 825, 828 (2011).
178. Simon et al., supra note 177, at 825, 828 (25-32% of respondents preferred study-specific opt
in consent).
179. Kettis-Lindblad et al., supra note 177, at 437.
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donate a blood sample.180 A Nigerian study also found that low-income
earners were worried about the use of their biospecimens by foreign
researchers.181 Clearly, there are different levels of concern regarding the use
of biological samples, and individuals have their own preferred mode of
participation in genetic/genomic research.182
In addition to the foregoing observations that cast doubt on the broad
consent exception, there is a theoretical weakness for circumnavigating
informed consent with broad consent.183 Informed consent requires sharing
supplementary information with participants when any change in the
circumstances renders previous information inadequate.184 In broad consent,
neither consent givers nor consent takers know exactly what study data will
be used for in the future.185 Without knowing details of future studies, the
participant has not given real “informed” consent to them.186 The substitution
of specific consent with broad consent can eviscerate informed consent.
Individuals with certain distinctive characteristics, or minorities, are more
likely to be victimized as a result of a missed opportunity to consent.187
In the ASU Incident, researchers omitted full disclosure and proceeded
with intrusive genetic research that was arguably compliant with the
Common Rule.188 The current exceptions to the informed consent
requirement become a loophole to scaled-up genetic research, particularly
when a group of powerless people are selected as a study population.189
The presence of consent, therefore, cannot eliminate tort liability.190 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that researchers cannot completely
180. Mezuk et al., supra note 177, at 173.
181. Michael A. Igbe & Clement A. Adebamowo, Qualitative study of knowledge and attitudes to
biobanking among lay persons in Nigeria, 13 BMC MED ETHICS 1 (2012).
182. Id. at 1, 8.
183. Risks related to broad consent appear to be not uniform, and some participants are affected
more than others. Peter A. Chow-White & Troy Duster, Do Health and Forensic DNA Databases Increase
Racial Disparities?, PLOS MED. 2011 8(10), at e1001100.
184. Researchers must inform participants of any adverse effects that are later discovered, for
example. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 110, at 7-8.
185. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.104(d), 46.116(d), (2018); Catherine Heeney & Michael Parker, Ethics
and The Governance of Biobanks, in GOVERNING BIOBANKS: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN
LAW AND PRACTICE 290-91 (Michael Parker ed., 2012).
186. The informed consent must include “. . . a description of the procedures to be followed, and
identification of any procedures which are experimental . . .” and “a description of any reasonably
foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (2018). In broad consent, it is not
possible to describe the procedures and foreseeable risks that future studies will entail with regards to
participants’ privacy.
187. See JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE
258-59 (2d ed. 2001); Evans, supra note 167, at 258-59 (explaining the problems of waiver of consent in
genetic research).
188. For pertinent discussions, see supra Argument Section C; Sterling, supra note 14, at 113.
189. Suzanne M. Rivera, Modernizing Research Regulations Is Not Enough: It’s Time to Think
Outside the Regulatory Box, 17 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1 2017 (7), at 1.
190. Grimes, 366 Md. at 99.
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immunize themselves by nominally obtaining consent, especially when the
information given to tested individuals, or their guardians, is incomplete in a
material aspect.191 In addition, even when a patient gave broad consent, the
patient’s claim for informed consent was not dismissed if an unhealed hole
developed from a surgery, which the patient claimed the surgeon was
responsible for.192
Accordingly, broad consent does not ensure everyone’s privacy. The
risks associated with invasive genetic/genomic analysis compel us to follow
an individualistic approach. Minority participants must not be neglected,
even if it is “atomistic.”193
2. Statutory Safeguards for Genetic/Genomic Privacy
The danger of discrimination against certain patient groups and the
reported misuse of genetic data have paved the way to stricter regulations on
the use of genetic information.194
The Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008 is a federal statute that protects
genetic/genomic privacy.195 GINA prohibits employment discrimination
based on genetic compositions and medical histories suggestive of genetic
aberrancies.196
The DNA Act governs the collection and use of
genetic/genomic
information—DNA
fingerprinting—in
criminal
investigations.197 GINA and the DNA Act strengthen genetic/genomic
privacy in two critical settings.198 Neither GINA nor the DNA Act, however,
realizes a tissue donors’ active control over genetic/genomic information or
provides comprehensive regulations.199 The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) protects medical information, but HIPAA does

191. Id. at 98.
192. Anderson v. Jones, 606 A.2d 185, 187-88 (D.C. 1992).
193. Evans, supra note 167, at 244-47
194. Amanda Tessmer, Pharmacogenomics and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008: Legislation Limitations and Its Impact on Pgx Research and Clinical Opportunity, 3 ST. LOUIS U.J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 153, 172 (2009).
195. Amanda Tessmer, Pharmacogenomics and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008: Legislation Limitations and Its Impact on Pgx Research and Clinical Opportunity, 3 ST. LOUIS U.J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 153, 172 (2009).
196. Id. at 172.
197. Pub. L. No. 106-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 USC, in part at 18 USC
§ 3563 and former 42 USC §§ 14132, 14135a, 14135e).
198. Sejin Ahn, Whose Genome Is It Anyway?: Re-identification and Privacy Protection in Public
and Participatory Genomics, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751, 772-73 (2015) (observing laws and regulations
regarding genomic privacy lagging behind the speed of development of the technology).
199. Hibbert, supra note 76 at 819.
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not add an extra layer of protection for genetic/genomic information.200
GINA and the DNA Act provide a floor for genetic privacy protection.201
There are a few state laws that aim to protect privacy in general. These
laws may restrict use and processing of genetic data by certain entities.202
3. Protection Outside Privacy
Several legal fabrics have offered relief for participants who have
suffered damages in genetic/genomic research.203 Fiduciary duty, which
governs medical providers’ obligation to promote interest of a patient, is one
option.204 Other approaches include the partnership analogy and the
application of public trust.205 These theories offer a helpful guidepost in
certain circumstances, but their scopes are limited because interactions
between researchers and participants do not always amount to a formation of
a joint enterprise or a trust.206
To the extent that genetic/genomic information can be seen as “common
good,” the approach that encourages participation of the general public is
supportable.207 Further, the engagement of a whole community that
participants belong to can augment mutual understanding between
researchers and participating community members.208
200. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, § 1173(d), Pub. L. No.
104-191 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2018)). The protected health information (PHI) is individually
identifiable information that is “transmitted by” or “maintained in electronic media” or other forms of
media. HIPAA requires the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all e-PHI when providers create,
receive, maintain or transmit PHI. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2.; 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
201. Supra note 194; Pub. L. No. 106-546.
202. See, e.g., CONSUMER DATA PROTECTION ACT OF 2021, VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-578 (West
2021) (requiring consent to processing of sensitive data such as genetic or biometric data); PRIVACY LAWS,
STATE OF CAL., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/privacy-laws (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
203. Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779, 788 (Wash. 1996); Anna B. Laakmann, When Should
Physicians Be Liable for Innovation?, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 913, 954 (2015); Karine Morin et al.,
Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials, 287 JAMA 78, 80-82 (2002); Angela
Holder, Do Researchers and Subjects Have a Fiduciary Relationship? 4 IRB 6 (1982).
204. One problem of this approach is the doctor-patient relationship requirement. See Vodopest,
913 P.2d at 788; Anna B. Laakmann, When Should Physicians Be Liable for Innovation?, 36 CARDOZO L.
REV. 913, 954 (2015); Morin et al., supra note 203, at 80-82; Holder, supra note 203.
205. See Greenberg v. Miami Child. Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1072–73, 175
(S.D. Fla. 2003) (joint venture); JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE 258-59 (2d ed. 2001) (citing PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON (Yale
University Press 1977), 5-6, as the framework of partnership); NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, ENG’G, AND
MED., RETURNING INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH RESULTS TO PARTICIPANTS: GUIDANCE FOR A NEW RESEARCH
PARADIGM 245 (Jeffrey R. Botkin et al. eds., 2018) (public trust).
206. See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines:
Courts on a Learning Curve, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 48 (2003) (denying a fiduciary duty in
biomedical research).
207. Public engagement or consultation may not substitute informed consent from individuals. See
Christensen, supra note 168, at 103; Barbara Prainsack, Research Populations: Biobanks in Israel, 26
NEW GENETICS AND SOC. 85, 97 (2007).
208. Chang, supra note 59, at 239 (examples of community engagement and public consultation).
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In contrast to these frameworks, the property theory introduces
individualistic, capitalistic perspectives.209 The theory vests individual tissue
donors with an ownership interest in tissues and genetic/genomic information
taken from their bodies.210 Under this theory, tissue donors may seek one or
more of the following: recovery of tissues and data; prohibition against use
of tissues and data; and a market value for use of tissues and data.211
In seeking control of extracted genetic/genomic information, aggrieved
tissue donors have relied on “ownership” interest in removed tissues, without
specifically stating they owned genetic/genomic information.212 The first
hurdle to their claims, and to the property theory, is the common law
antipathy against ownership interest in human bodies.213 Arguments based
on the property theory have mostly failed.214 Rejecting a plaintiff’s assertion
that a doctor had converted his spleen tissues, California’s highest court
concluded that a patient is not an owner of tissues removed from a body.215
The court reasoned that the law of property should not apply to human tissues
given that freedom to dispose of tissues is nonexistent.216 Greenberg v.
Miami Children’s Hospital also refused to recognize patients’ ownership
interest in tissues when researchers defied the patients’ expectations that an
affordable treatment would be created from tissue donations.217

209. See Catherine M. Valerio Barrard, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87 NW. U. L.
REV. 1037, 1061-66 (1993).
210. See id. (the value of genetic data to insurers).
211. The property theory argues that the denial of property rights in human tissues and
genetic/genomic information is unsustainable when human tissues are valuable tradable objects. See
George J. Annas et al., THE GENETIC PRIVACY ACT AND COMMENTARY 67 (1995); Danielle M. Wagner,
Comment, Property Rights in the Human Body: The Commercialization of Organ Transplantation and
Biotechnology, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 931, 934 (1995) (stating that “. . . the right to exclude others from one’s
property, which is considered the most important right in the bundle of property rights, is generally present
in relation to the human body.”); see also, Judith Jarvis Thomson, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 225 (1990)
(stating that property rights are a cluster of rights); Rao, supra note 120, at 460.
212. See Greenberg v. Miami Child. Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1072–73, 175
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
213. At common law, no one is allowed to own or sell human tissues. Courts refused to find interests
in human body parts on the ground that a cadaver was nullius in bonis, and no property existed in a corpse.
3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 203 (1644). A designated recipient in organ
transplant has no property claim over a donated organ. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 860
N.E.2d 713, 719-720 (N.Y. 2006).
A few opinions suggest that either a deceased person, or a medical institution that obtained samples under
informed consent, has ownership interest in tissues. See, e.g., Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th
836, 850 (1993) (interest in one’s sperm); Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1002-03 (E.D.
Mo. 2006) (ownership over exercised tissues), aff’d, 490 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 2007). A surviving
relative can possess the deceased’s body for burial purposes. Samantak Ghosh, The Taking of Human
Biological Products, 102 CAL. L. REV. 511, 518 (2014).
214. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d. 120, 137-38 (1990).
215. Id. at 137, 142-47.
216. Id.
217. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1072–73.
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Professor Ken Gatter considered Moore and Greenberg as faithful to
federal law, which minimally protects tissue donors’ interests.218 At the
center of the plaintiffs’ complaint was the defendants’ commercial
exploitation of research results, rather than the defendants’ possession and
use of tissues or data.219 Thus, Moore and Greenberg did not show the close
connection between the plaintiffs’ privacy interest and extracted
genetic/genomic data.220 The plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants
invaded their privacy either.221
In contrast, recent court opinions shed some light on genetic/genomic
privacy—a nexus between samples and extracted genetic/genomic
information.222 For instance, the Ninth Circuit recognized the connection
between a donor’s privacy in a blood sample and extracted genetic
information and suggested that the blood sample was a convict’s property.223
Likewise, Justice Mosk’s dissent in Moore expressed a view that the
plaintiff’s dignity and sanctity would become nullity when researchers could
freely commercialize tissue donors’ genetic/genomic information.224 The
Ninth Circuit and Justice Mosk did not formerly accept the property right
theory nor did they find a possessory interest for the plaintiffs.225 However,
both recognized essentially the same interest with privacy, after noting the
genetic/genomic information was obtained from the analysis of the plaintiffs’
tissues and contained a critical part of the plaintiffs’ privacy.226 The
218. Professor Gatter notes Moore and Greenberg’s failure to appreciate the nexus between the
extracted genetic/genomic information and donated tissues. Gatter, supra note 75, at 306, 311-18.
219. Gatter, supra note 75, at 310-11.
220. Moore’s recognition of the doctor’s fiduciary duty does not help most research participants and
tissue donors because researchers usually do not owe fiduciary duty to them. Also, informed consent is
not a modality that allows a claimant to repossess biospecimens. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 142-47. See also
Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1072-73 (granting restitution due to the continuing research collaboration
that involved the plaintiffs’ investment of time and resources).
221. The prevailing view is that property rights are not a proper vehicle for privacy, which is an
inalienable interest. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, 2 RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY § 10:1 (2d ed. 2019); see generally Moore, 51 Cal. 3d 120; Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064.
222. E.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 506-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 51 Cal. 3d at 142-47 (Cal. 1990). See Gatter, supra note 75 at 311-13 (“the Court
of Appeals saw a nexus between Moore’s cells and its information.”)
223. The Ninth Circuit held that Kriesel was seeking the return of “property” given that the Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(a)(2)(A) defines property as “documents, books, papers, any other tangible
objects, and information” U.S. v. Kriesel, 720 F.3d 1137, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff requested
a return of blood sample, not removal of his DNA profile, created by the use of junk DNA, from the
CODIS database. Kriesel, 720 F.3d at 1150.
224. Judge Mosk stated that the pertinent inquiry (in a conversion claim) is not whether a patient
generally retains an ownership interest in a body part after its removal from his body, but rather whether
a patient has a right to determine, before the body part is removed, the use to which the part will be put
after removal. Judge Mosk found it clear that a patient does have such right based on his autonomy.
Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 174 (1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
225. Kriesel, 720 F.3d at 1147; Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 160.
226. Kriesel, 720 F.3d at 1139-41; Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 174.
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plaintiffs’ genetic integrity would have been lost if the plaintiffs’ tissues and
information would have been used disrespectfully.227
4. Empowerment of Participants
It is firmly established that an individual participant’s autonomy and
basic rights must be respected in the field of human research.228 The
Nuremberg Code obligates medical professionals to inform patients to arrive
at an “understanding and enlightened decision.”229 The Declaration of
Helsinki set the standard for informed consent.230 In the United States, the
National Research Act prevents unethical uninformed human experiments.231
Autonomy of participants has been the cornerstone of biomedical ethics.232
Nonetheless, disputes over the use of biological samples have
continued.233 To rebuild trust of research participants, studies were carried
out to understand how to aid participants’ informed decision to participate.234
The following measures were found to assist informed consent: increased
transparency;235 the reexamination of informed consent taking;236 the
227. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 174.
228. ALEXANDER MITSCHERLICH & FRED MIELKE, DOCTORS OF INFAMY: THE STORY OF THE NAZI
MEDICAL CRIMES, at xxiii-xxv (Heinz Norden trans., 1949).
229. Id.
230. Every precaution should be taken to respect the privacy of the subject, the confidentiality of
the patient’s information and to minimize the impact of the study on the subject’s physical and mental
integrity and on the personality of the subject. WORLD MED. ASS’N, Declaration of Helsinki: Code of
Ethics of the World Medical Association, art. III(3a), G.A. Res. (1964), http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov
/picrender.fcgi?artid=1816102&blobtype=pdf.
231. The National Research Act was devised to prohibit unethical and inhumane treatment of
research participants, as experienced in the U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee.
National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.); The U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee: Research Implications,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/after.htm.
232. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2009) (“from its origins with the trial
of the Nazi doctors at Nuremburg through its evolution in international conventions, agreements,
declarations, and domestic laws and regulations, the norm prohibiting nonconsensual medical
experimentation on human subjects has become firmly embedded and has secured universal acceptance in
the community of nations”).
233. Sterling, supra note 14, at 113.
234. See, e.g., Yusuf Yazici & Hasan Yazici, Informed Consent: Time for More Transparency, 12
ARTHRITIS RES. & THERAPY 121 (2010).
235. See id. (consent form disclosure); Akihiko Ozaki et al., A Call for Improved Transparency in
Financial Aspects of Clinical Trials: A Case Study of the CREATE-X Trial in the New England Journal of
Medicine, 36 INVESTIGATIONAL NEW DRUGS 517 (2018) (conflict disclosure); Omer Tene & Jules
Polonetsky, Judged by The Tin Man: Individual Rights in The Age of Big Data, 11 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. 351, 366 (2013) (access and transparency); Elizabeth R. Pike, Securing Sequences: Ensuring
Adequate Protections for Genetic Samples in the Age of Big Data, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1977, 2010 (2016)
(post-enrollment transparency regarding the law enforcement’s access to biobanks).
236. One study found that it is desirable to inform participants about who can access data. It found
that over 25 % of the research participants did not remember that they signed an informed consent
document to participate and that the majority (54 %) could not correctly identify with whom they had
agreed to share their genomic data. Jill Oliver Robinson et al., Participants’ Recall and Understanding of
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engagement of a neutral who acts for participants’ interest;237 and the option
to opt-out from research.238 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization recommended the establishment of a global vigilance
system that provides privacy protection for health information.239 The
enhancement of informed consent will benefit participants and prevent
privacy harms.240
The National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
recommends sharing research results with participants.241
The
recommendation is grounded on the understanding that participants’ support
and trust is crucial to biomedical advancement,242 and the fact that people
donate tissues in the expectation that their participation would create better
care.243
In short, the principles of autonomy and informed consent are wellpreserved and recognized.244 Improving informed consent with further
protection measures minimizes future privacy invasion.245

Genomic Research and Large Scale Data Sharing, 8(4) J. OF EMPIRICAL RSCH. ON HUMAN RSCH.ETHICS
42 (2013); See also Zubin Master & David B. Resnik, Incorporating Exclusion Clauses into Informed
Consent for Biobanking, 22 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 203, 203 (2013) (exclusion clause in
contentious research).
237. See David E. Winickoff & Richard N. Winickoff, The Charitable Trust as a Model for Genomic
Biobanks, 349 NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 1180, 1180 (2003); JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED
CONSENT LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 297-99 (2nd ed. 2001) (explaining why it is desirable
to have a neutral third party to step in for the interests of participants.); Mark A. Hall, Property, Privacy,
and the Pursuit of Interconnected Electronic Medical Records, 95 IOWA L. REV. 631, 658 (2010); NAT’L
ACAD. OF SCIENCES, ENG’G, AND MED., RETURNING INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH RESULTS TO PARTICIPANTS:
GUIDANCE FOR A NEW RESEARCH PARADIGM 245 (Jeffrey R. Botkin et al. eds., 2018) (Committee on the
Return of Individual-Specific Research Results Generated in Research Laboratories Recommendation)
(importance of trust) [hereinafter CRIRR Recommendation].
238. Eric Vermeulen et al., Opt-out Plus, the Patients’ Choice: Preferences of Cancer Patients
Concerning Information and Consent Regimen for Future Research With Biological Samples Archived in
the Context of Treatment, 62 J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 275, 275-78 (2009).
239. U.N. EDUC., SCI., AND CULTURAL ORG., INT’L BIOETHICS COMM., Report of the IBC on Big
Data and Health, U.N. Doc. SHS/YES/IBC-24/17/3 Rev.2 (Sep. 15, 2017) (UNESCO-IBC Report),
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/bioethics/international-bioethicscommittee/reports-and-advices.
240. There are participants who are interested in privacy protective measures adopted by
investigators. Alma Husedzinovic et al., Stakeholders’ Perspectives on Biobank-Based Genomic
Research: Systematic Review of the Literature, 23 EUR. J. HUMAN GENETICS 1607 (2015) (the role of
information about privacy protection).
241. CRIRR Recommendation, supra note 237, at 80.
242. Id. at 82.
243. Andrea N. Burnett-Harman et al., Return of Research-Related Genetic Test Results and Genetic
Discrimination Concerns: Facilitators and Barriers of Genetic Research Participation in Diverse Groups,
23 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 59 (2020) (finding that “Respondents willing to participate in genetic
research” ranging “from 22% when no results are returned to 87% if health-related genetic results are
returned”).
244. Supra notes 228-30, 235-238.
245. Supra note 239, at 22-24.
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5. Quasi-property to Preserve Genetic Integrity
Granted that tissue donors do not hold property interests in
genetic/genomic materials, tissue donors should not be left without
remedy.246 Equivalent to the nexus pointed out by the Ninth Circuit and
Justice Mosk, quasi-property is founded upon the nexus between
reproductive tissues or human remains and the dignity of their hosts and
family.247 A piece of genetic/genomic information, when it is critical to one’s
dignity and autonomy, may be recognized as quasi-property.248
A quasi-property right defends inmost pieces of privacy as they are
epitomized in human remains and reproductive tissues.249 Quasi-property
rights should apply to genetic/genomic information because of its comparable
significance.250 In a case where a couple asserted a property right over their
frozen pre-zygotes created by in vitro fertilization, the court allowed their
recovery based on their property rights.251 In Hecht v. Superior Court, the
Court of Appeal for the Second District of California took a similar position
and stated that at the time of death the decedent had ownership interest “to
the extent that he had decision making authority” over the use of his sperm.252
Thus, the use of quasi-property has been confined to biological materials with
special implications—human remains and reproductive tissues.253 The
opinions’ reasoning for finding quasi-property should be extendable to
genetic/genomic information because genetic codes are the source of human
development, and no person can live with dignity if his or her genetic integrity

246. Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 137, 142-43, 162-63.
247. See Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80, 89-91 (Ch. 1940) (recognizing a
constitutional right to personal privacy and security as well as common law privacy right and denying a
petition for compulsory blood test); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
248. Lisa M. Elliott, Property Rights of Ancient DNA: the Impact of Cultural Importance on the
Ownership of Genetic Information, 16(2) Int’l J. of Cultural Prop. 103, 108-9, 113-14 (2009).
249. Restatement of Tort views quasi-property rights as special legal interests of close relatives over
human remains of a deceased. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1977) (a judicially created term
for the control of a body part).
250. The court afforded damages for the plaintiff when the defendant, a reinternment contractor,
recklessly buried a deceased’s body in a shallow grave without casket, case, or full headstone. Sanford v.
Ware, 191 Va. 43, 60 S.E.2d 10, 11-14 (1950). See also Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc.,
174 W. Va. 458, 460-61, 327 S.E.2d 438, 440-41 (1985) (finding the relative’s quasi-property right against
mishandling of a decedent’s body); Payne v. Alabama Cemetery Ass’n, Inc., 413 So.2d 1067, 1068-70
(Ala. 1982) (trespass action by an heir when her mother’s body was sinking and destroyed by an omission
of a funeral home).
251. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-27 (E.D. Va. 1989) (finding the “plaintiffs’ proprietary”
right under a cryopreservation agreement, which stated that the plaintiffs could choose “(1) donation to
another infertile couple; (2) donation for approved research; and (3) thawing” if a pregnancy was no more
sought).
252. Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 850 (2nd Dist. 1993).
253. See supra notes 249-252 and accompanying texts.
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is compromised.254 In this day and age, when genetic/genomic technologies
can affect one’s life, health, dignity, and life planning, a quasi-property right
should be applicable to genetic/genomic information.
Professor Rao noted that the claim for an embryo, which potentially
forms a human being, should be decided under privacy while body tissues
that do not develop into a human being can be decided by the property
theory.255 Professor Rao’s analysis seems to be grounded on the reasonable
connection between body tissues and a claimant’s personhood and
parenthood.256 In other words, a couple can claim quasi-property over their
embryos that represent their personhood and parenthood.257 Likewise, a
pregnant woman or a couple who has been attempting to conceive a child or
have conceived a fetus should be free to use genetic testing and obtain
genetic/genomic information for medical care and family planning.
Likewise, tribal members, who believe in the sacredness of DNA, had a
dignitary interest comparable to human remains for blood samples containing
genetic/genomic materials because the genetic/genomic materials are an
integral part of their personhood.258 In these situations, genetic/genomic
information should qualify as quasi-property.259
While quasi-property changes its form when biological tissues are used
to produce data, the protection afforded by quasi-property is sufficiently
circumscribed.260 First, the information must be essential to the tissue donor’s
dignity and autonomy.261 When genetic/genomic information is too
fragmented to be used beyond minimal analysis, the quasi-property does not
apply because no specific individual can be identified and because it’s
unlikely to harm the dignity or autonomy of anyone.262 For example, a
sequenced short segment of a dementia-related gene (APOE e4) does not
specify from whom the genetic information originates.263 Even if a sequence
254. See supra Sections A, B for why genetic/genomic information has significance upon one’s
familial and reproductive autonomy and dignity.
255. Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 458 (2000) (“In
the absence of a relationship between the person and the embryo, however, the embryo may be addressed
as an object of ownership governed by the law of property.”).
256. See supra notes 222-224 and accompanying texts for the nexus between biological samples
and genetic/genomic information.
257. Rao, supra note 120, at 458-59.
258. See infra Argument Section C for the discussion about the ASU Incident.
259. William Boulier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property
Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 712 (1995); Megan L. Townsley, Note, Is There
Any Body Out There? A Call For a New Body of Law To Protect Individual Ownership Interests in Tissue
Samples Used in Medical Research, 54 WASHBURN L. J. 683, 683 (2015).
260. See also Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 137.
261. See supra notes 249-252 and accompanying texts.
262. Kriesel, 720 F.3d at 1149-50.
263. Paolo Abondio et al., The Genetic Variability of APOE in Different Human Populations and
Its Implications for Longevity, 10 GENES (BASEL) 222 (2019).
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suggests a high probability of developing dementia, the short sequence alone
cannot be proclaimed as quasi-property because a tissue donor’s privacy is
likely not endangered by unconsented use of the gene. On the other hand, a
court may sustain a privacy action of a tissue donor when a researcher has
made a false statement that no genetic information will be collected or
used.264
Second, quasi-property must be materials that represent a claimant’s
dignity and autonomy.265 When disputed genetic/genomic information is
obtained from someone unrelated to a claimant, the claimant may not claim
a quasi-property right over the information.266 On the contrary, when a
sibling of a claimant has dementia and the sibling’s genetic data is used to
reveal the inheritance of dementia, the data may be relevant to the claimant’s
informational privacy.267 Additionally, one tribal member’s participation in
a genetic study can impact informational privacy of the entire tribal
community, as previously discussed.268 In this situation, consultation with
the tribe’s leader should be considered because other members’ autonomy
and dignity may be damaged by the study’s findings, and the member can
understand risks and benefits that are associated with the study
participation.269
As such, quasi-property rights should apply to genetic/genomic
information to a tissue donor’s privacy and those related individuals’ when
the information has ramifications to the procreative, familial, marital, or other
highly intimate matters. Quasi-property does not require defendants’ “highly
offensive” acts but requires the nexus between unconsented use of
information and the claimant’s autonomy and dignity.270
6. Recent Developments to Quasi-Property
The
logic
underlying
quasi-property—the
connection
of
genetic/genomic information to tissue donors’ life-defining choices and their
personhood—has resurfaced in privacy cases.271 The following opinions
demonstrate judicial affirmation of genetic privacy.

264. Supra notes 99-100, 102-104 and accompanying texts for the discussion of subjectunidentifiable information in privacy actions.
265. Supra notes 249-252 and accompanying texts.
266. Boulier, supra note 259, at 709-10.
267. Because results may show that the claimant has the same genetic mutation responsible for
dementia.
268. See supra Introduction.
269. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, ENG’G, AND MED., AN EXAMINATION OF EMERGING
BIOETHICAL ISSUES IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP 55-60 (2020).
270. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
271. See infra Section 6.

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU,

29

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 48 [], Iss. 1, Art. 2

72

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

A lawsuit filed against Indiana statute “Sex Selective and Disability
Abortion Ban” highlighted the nexus between genetic testing and procreative
freedom.272 Fetal tissue dispositions were restricted with an abortion
motivated by the likelihood of genetic abnormality.273 The challenger argued
that Indiana unconstitutionally restricted the challenger’s freedom to obtain
an abortion based on genetic testing and liberty to dispose of excised fetal
tissues.274 The District Court for the South District of Indiana found the
restrictions unconstitutional under rational basis,275 and the Seventh Circuit’s
panel upheld the invalidation.276 Denying the request for en banc review, the
Seventh Circuit suggested that rational basis was the wrong standard for a
fundamental right of procreative choices.277 Chief Judge Wood indicated that
abortion decisions based on genetic abnormalities of a fetus, as well as the
right to dispose fetal tissues, are constitutionally protected as fundamental
rights.278
The Supreme Court reversed the conclusion on the fetal tissue disposition
on the ground that the Seventh Circuit had erroneously applied the rational
basis test.279 However, the Court noted that the plaintiffs’ fetal disposal
challenge was not argued under the undue burden test and withheld an
opinion on the application of the undue burden test in dicta.280 As Justice
Ginsburg explained, the incorporation of a pregnant woman’s liberty to
control fetal tissue into the constitutional privacy was an expected
272. “PPINK[Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky] sought declaratory and injunctive relief
from” the following: (1) the “‘Sex Selective and Disability Abortion Ban,’ Ind. Code § 16-34-4 (2016),
which prohibit a person from performing an abortion if the person knows the woman is seeking an abortion
solely for one of the enumerated reasons;” (2) the required step to inform women “[t]hat Indiana does not
allow a fetus to be aborted solely because of the fetus’s race, color, national origin, or ancestry, sex, or
diagnosis or potential diagnosis of the fetus having Down syndrome or any other disability § 16-34-21.1(a)(1)(K);” and (3) the “provisions dealing with the disposal of aborted fetuses”, §§ 16-34-3-4(a); 1641-16-4(d); 16-41-16-5; 16-41-16-7.6. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State
Dep’t of Health, 888 F.3d 300, 302-03 (7th Cir. 2018).
273. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 888 F.3d at 303.
274. Id. at 306-07.
275. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 265 F. Supp.
3d 859, 862-63, 871-72 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (invalidating the fetal tissue regulation for lack of legitimate
interest under rational basis), aff’d per curiam, 888 F.3d 300, rev’d with regards to the fetal disposition
provision, Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019).
276. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 888 F.3d at 308-09, rev’d with regards to the fetal
disposition provision Box, 139 S. Ct. 1780.
277. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 917 F.3d
532, 535-36 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (denying en banc hearing and stating that the court was bound
by the arguments made by the parties); see also Box, 139 S. Ct. 1780 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“I would
not summarily reverse a judgment when application of the proper standard would likely yield restoration
of the judgment.”).
278. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 917 F.3d at 534.
279. Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1782.
280. Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1782 (“This case, as litigated, therefore does not implicate our cases applying
the undue burden test to abortion regulations.”).
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development from previous decisions since the constitutional privacy has
been afforded to liberties essential to a person’s autonomy and dignity.281
These liberties include liberty in marriage, abortion, reproduction, and sexual
activity.282 Just like quasi-property, which resides in matters imperative to a
familial relationship and a family’s dignity, the Court should offer
constitutional protection for the recovery of a fetal tissue from an actor who
tarnishes the plaintiff’s protected dignity and autonomy.283
Freedom to obtain genetic information has been recognized, insofar as
the court decided the claimants had standing, as a constitutional liberty, which
furthers the freedom to control fetal tissues.284 The Sixth Circuit indicated
that a parent has a right to control and use genetic information taken from
neonatal screening.285 The court suggested that strict scrutiny should apply
to the parent’s right to use genetic information for care of a child.286
Based on the preceding discussion, freedom to access and control fetal
genetic/genomic information and freedom to dispose of fetal tissues are
recognized as constitutionally protected liberties.287 Given the significance
of genetic/genomic information to a person’s health, procreation, and family
relationship, freedom to use genetic/genomic information deserves legal
protections. While courts did not mention “quasi-property,” the logic behind
the above opinions coincides with quasi-property.288 The liberty to control
one’s own and one’s child’s genetic/genomic information is a matter of
constitutional privacy because it is a linchpin to our personal values,
procreative choices, bodily integrity, and familial health.289 Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the state is prohibited from imposing undue
restrictions upon the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights of privacy.290

281. Id. at 1792.
282. Id.; City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 427; Roe, 410 U.S. at 169-70 (Stewart, J., concurring).
283. Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1781.
284. Kanuszewski v. Mich. HHS, 927 F.3d 396, 409-11 (6th Cir. 2019).
285. Id. (finding a child’s standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as damages, in
connection with Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims relating to the transfer and storage of a blood
sample). But see Laporte v. Gordon, 2020 WL 1429496 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2020) (finding the special
needs doctrine exception to the Fourth Amendment).
286. Kanuszewski, 927 F.3d at 419.
287. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 265 F. Supp. 3d at 869, aff’d per curiam, 888 F.3d
300, rev’d with regards to the fetal disposition provision; Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1782 (reversing the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion on the fetal tissue disposition based on Indiana’s legitimate interest). But see Box, at
1786-87 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining the limitation to a parent’s abortion right based on the fetal
genetic abnormality).
288. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a.
289. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
290. See generally Doe, 410 U.S. 179; Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438; City of Akron
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983); Casey, 505 U.S. at 883-84.
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7. Summary
Quasi-property rights arise from matters of genetic significance, such as
reproductive tissues, and ancestral remains.291 Granting quasi-property rights
resemble the protection from fundamental rights of privacy.292 Both quasiproperty and privacy rights should extend to such genetic/genomic
information that is integral to a person’s dignity and autonomy. Quasiproperty claims are, therefore, only allowed for information tightly attached
to the claimant’s privacy while affording sufficient protection.293
The next section will project the quasi-property theory onto the ASU
Incident and the senator’s DNA test and discuss how to identify
genetic/genomic information that has a nexus to tissue donors’ autonomy and
dignity.294
C. Arizona State University Lawsuit
1. Facts of the Case and Traditional Privacy Law
In 1989, Havasupai Tribe consulted a professor of ASU with regard to
the increasing disease burden caused by diabetes.295 The professor proposed
a tribe-wide genetic study as a means to determine the genetic basis of
diabetes among Havasupai Tribe.296 The professor’s fellow geneticist, who
was interested in genetic causes of schizophrenia, agreed to be a primary
investigator.297 The tribe decided to participate in the study, and members
gave written or oral consent to the study participation.298 The signed consent
forms ambiguously stated that collected samples would be used for research
on “behavioral/medical disorders” while the tribe members did not know that
samples would be used for purposes other than diabetes research.299
The geneticist examined samples to find a genetic basis for conditions
such as schizophrenia and performed a migration study without specifically
seeking consent from the tribe or the members.300 The rate of inbreeding
291. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a.
292. See supra note 290.
293. See UNESCO-IBC Report, supra note 175; Celia B. Fisher & Deborah M. Layman, Genomics,
Big Data, and Broad Consent, 19 PREVENTION SCI. 871, 876 (2018) (“The extent to which unspecified
secondary use of biospecimens can pose a social risk to already vulnerable populations is difficult to
anticipate or describe in broad consent procedures.”).
294. See infra Section C.
295. Van Assche et al., supra note 14, at 56-57.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Van Assche et al., supra note 14, at 57. Professor Markow, the geneticist who conducted
Havasupai genetic study, applied for and obtained funding to study schizophrenia. It was not disclosed to
participants. Van Assche et al., supra note 14, at 57.
299. Id.
300. Id.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol48/iss1/2

32

Kitaoka: Is Information Property? Distinctive Genetic Information Has anAn

2021]

IS INFORMATION PROPERTY?

75

within the tribe and their genetic distances to other populations were
published.301 Moreover, the geneticist sent blood samples to her new
institution despite conflicting provisions in the consent form.302 These facts
were ultimately discovered by Havasupai Tribe.303
Havasupai Tribe demanded immediate termination of the genetic
research.304 When the parties failed to reach an amicable solution, the tribe
sued ASU and the researchers for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, a violation
of informed consent, and conversion.305 Some claims were dismissed, but the
breach of fiduciary duty and other state claims remained.306 Faced with years
of litigation, ASU agreed to pay $700,000 to the tribe and to return all the
samples and obtained information.307
Had the parties not settled, the court would have decided on the
defendants’ contention that they had obtained broad consent and that they had
used coded samples without personal identifiers.308 Although ASU’s
$700,000 settlement may not quantify ASU’s anticipated losses, it is clear
that ASU was motivated to settle.309
As discussed earlier, the substitution of specific informed consent with
broad consent may seriously tarnish tissue donors’ autonomy when the tissue
donors are not informed of the nature of additional studies.310 Moreover, the
presence of consent does not always exclude a privacy claim because the
scope of consent and the validity of consent are distinct issues.311 The tribe
leaders and the participants were not informed about the geneticist’s
301. See Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1067 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (“at
least four doctoral dissertations and various academic papers, some of which concerned evolutionary
genetics, rather than medical genetics”) denying review in part, granting in part; Havasupai Tribe v.
ABoR, No. CV-09-0007-PR, 2009 Ariz. LEXIS 82, at *1 (Apr. 20, 2009); Therese A. Markow et al., HLA
Polymorphism in the Havasupai: Evidence for Balancing Selection, 53 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 943
(1993); Therese A. Markow & John F. Martin, Inbreeding and Developmental Stability in a Small Human
Population, 20 ANNALS HUMAN BIOLOGY 389 (1993); Tatiana M. Karafet et al., Y Chromosome Markers
and Trans-Bering Strait Dispersals, 102 AM. J. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 301 (1997).
302. The researchers argued that since those samples were coded and individual donors could not
be identified, no information had left ASU. Van Assche et al., supra note 14, at 59.
303. Havasupai Tribe, 204 P.3d at 1068.
304. A notice of claim to ASU and the geneticist indicated that “ASU’s actions have invaded the
personal privacy of Havasupai tribal members and the cultural and religious privacy of the Havasupai
Tribe.” Havasupai Tribe, 204 P.3d at 1068.
305. See Tilousi v. Ariz. State Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. 04-CV-1290-PCT-FJM, 2005 WL 6199562
(D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2005) (Slip Op.); Havasupai Tribe, 204 P.3d at 1069-70; Debra Harry, Indigenous
Peoples and Gene Disputes, 84 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 147, 152 (2009).
306. Havasupai Tribe, 204 P.3d at 1069-70.
307. Van Assche et al., supra note 14, at 61-62.
308. Id. at 74-75.
309. The informed consent claim may not have succeeded depending on the jurisdiction given that
some of the defendants lacked a doctor-patient relationship. See supra Argument Sections A, B.
310. See infra Argument Section B for the discussion of broad consent.
311. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 366 Md. 29, 98 (2001); Anderson v. Jones, 606
A.2d 185, 187-88 (D.C. 1992).
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immigration study and inbreeding study.312 No member would have likely
participated in the research if they had been informed. The researchers’
consent-based arguments must have failed.
Another point of contention, the de-identification of samples, seems
easier to decide. When determining whether an exception from the informed
consent requirement applies, it is a key consideration under the Common
Rule.313 The geneticists may have believed that their compliance with the
Common Rule had resolved all the issues. Nevertheless, the court could have
found that the migration study and the inbreeding study had harmed the
plaintiffs’ privacy given that the studies had involved sufficiently limited,
potentially traceable participants. Also, the Third Circuit’s logic in the
network privacy case, if followed, would have eliminated the identifiability
test subjects from a contestable issue, especially when participants were
misled by defendants’ statements.314
Privacy invasions are highly offensive to reasonable persons.315 The
offensiveness of an intrusion is measured by factors such as the “likelihood
of serious harm to the victim”, the degree and setting of the intrusion, the
intruder’s motives and objectives, and whether countervailing interests or
social norms render the intrusion inoffensive.316 ASU’s researchers used
samples for purely academic purposes.317 The researchers obtained broad
consent forms from 100 participants and stopped using broad consent forms
because the document-based process did not help the participants’
understanding of genetic/genomic research.318 These facts may have offset
“offensiveness” of the defendants’ acts to some degree. Accordingly, the
plaintiffs’ privacy invasion claims may have faced a few difficulties in
alleging a prima facie case.319
2. Application of Quasi-Property
Unlike the more relaxed identifiability requirement in privacy actions,
quasi-property claims require the identifiability of data subjects or the nexus
between human tissues and privacy interests.320 Accordingly, quasi-property
claims would not have succeeded as to the collected genetic/genomic
information because it was de-identified. On the other hand, the blood
312. Van Assche et al., supra note 14, at 58-59.
313. See 42 U.S.C. § 241 (d)(4) (2012).
314. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 294. See supra Argument Section A.
315. See supra Argument Section A.
316. See supra Argument Section A; supra note 98.
317. Van Assche et al., supra note 14, at 57.
318. Id.
319. Havasupai Tribe, 204 P.3d at 1078 (‘“general damages’, which by nature are subjective, deeply
personal and often difficult to quantify.”).
320. See supra Argument Section B. 5.
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samples contained enough DNA elements for the participants’ identification
could have constituted the tribe members’ quasi-property because the blood
samples were thought to be equivalent to their sacred body.321
The unauthorized use of blood samples can harm the participants’ dignity
and decision-making in their familial or life planning matters, especially
under the circumstance of the ASU Incident.322 The researchers at ASU
analyzed the blood samples to determine the tribe’s migration and inbreeding
without providing information or seeking specific authorization.323 Because
the tribe considers DNA as a part of a person,324 the research should have
respected the tribe’s core values and dignity and the autonomy of the tribal
relationship.325 Hence, under quasi-property, the plaintiffs could have sought
return of their samples, in addition to damages, on the ground that the
unauthorized DNA analysis and the disclosure harmed their dignity and
autonomy326 regardless of whether broad consent existed or whether the
defendants did it solely for academic purposes.327
The estimated outcome under quasi-property parallels the actual
resolution of the case. While privacy claims would have been contestable,
quasi-property could have realized an effective resolution.
D. Senator’s DNA Test v. Cherokee Nation’s Legacy
1. Facts of the Case and Traditional Privacy Law
Regarding Senator Warren’s DNA test, her privacy was not at the heart
of the controversy.328 The Cherokee Nation’s self-governance was one of the
privacy interests allegedly disturbed by the senator’s DNA testing.329
Assuming members of the Cherokee Nation hold informational privacy
interests in their blood samples and information, what arguments could the
Cherokee Nation or their members have made? Would the Cherokee Nation
or their members have successfully pursued a privacy action? What about a
quasi-property claim to block the senator’s use of DNA testing or to prevent
a testing company’s use of DNA and information?

321. Van Assche et al., supra note 14, at 56.
322. See supra Argument Section A.
323. Havasupai Tribe, 204 P.3d at 1076 (‘“an additional unauthorized test . . . can be sufficient to
state a claim for relief for intrusion upon seclusion.”‘) (quoting Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d
1060, 1068 (Colo. App. 1998)).
324. Petit, supra note 3.
325. Id.
326. Van Assche et al., supra note 14, at 55.
327. See supra Argument Section A.
328. Kessler, supra note 1. The senator would not have received protection for her widely published
test results.
329. Petit, supra note 3.
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Regarding the privacy invasion claim against the senator, it is unlikely
that the court would have found any invasion because the senator herself took
the DNA test and did not take any sample or confidential information from a
member of the Cherokee Nation.330 Additionally, the senator did not attempt
to intervene in the tribe’s determination of citizenship.331 The disclosure of
her DNA test may not have been considered a threat to the tribe’s privacy.
The disclosed information was only a conclusion of the testing company in
contrast to a situation where the member’s genetic sequence was obtained
and published as evidence.332 The court would have denied the claim of
privacy invasion against the senator. 333 Even if privacy invasion had existed,
the senator’s action would not have been “highly offensive to a reasonable
person” because the senator had a legitimate reason for taking a DNA test to
know her ancestry.334 Thus, the court likely would not have returned a
favorable ruling for the Cherokee Nation or its members.
Similarly, a privacy invasion claim against the testing company may not
have succeeded. If the company had obtained a DNA sample of a tribal
member, and had used it against the member’s will, it may have constituted
a privacy invasion.335 However, it is probable that the company would use
information in the public domain. In such a case, the use of information
would not have been found to be an intentional invasion of the donor’s
privacy given that no intentional attack on the donor’s privacy would have
been found.336
As with the ASU Incident, the lack of highly offensive conduct would
have been another reason to dismiss the claim.337 Also, the issue of
identifiability of a tissue donor and the existence of a tissue donor’s consent
could have complicated the tribe’s case.338 However, the identifiability and
the consent are fact dependent issues.339 As with the ASU Incident, these are
often not dispositive.
In sum, the tribe and its members would not have succeeded in privacy
invasion claims against the senator. Also, the claims against the testing

330. Kessler, supra note 1. The genetic testing company that offered DNA testing to the senator
may have obtained ancestry information from public sources.
331. Kessler, supra note 1.
332. Id.; Van Assche et al., supra note 14, at 55.
333. See supra Argument Section A.
334. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying texts.
335. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d at 293-294. See supra Argument Section
A.
336. There is no intentional unauthorized use of data. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying
texts.
337. Van Assche et al., supra note 14.
338. See supra Argument Section A.
339. Id.
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company may have failed as well due to a lack of an intentional privacy
invasion.
2. Quasi-property claim
Quasi-property protects a tissue donor’s dignity and autonomy in
familial, procreative, or life planning matters.340 If the company possesses
DNA samples taken from members of the Cherokee Nation, and uses them
for commercial purposes, the member’s rights, under a quasi-property theory,
may have been a basis for a favorable result for the tribe.341
The member may have held a quasi-property right in the sample given
that the member probably considers the ancestry information a part of the self
and as valuable as information related to family planning matters. Upon
proving that the commercial use of the sample conflicted with the member’s
core privacy values, the member should have been able to suspend offensive
uses.
By contrast, if the company did not have any sample or identifiable
information about the member, quasi-property claims may not have prevailed
because quasi-property does not extend to de-identified information.342 Thus,
members’ quasi-property claims concerning identifiable information may
have been successful.
The tribe’s interest in connection to the company’s DNA testing presents
a challenging issue. In one aspect, the tribe, as a group, may have owned a
certain privacy interest over samples and genetic/genomic information taken
from the tribe members. However, it is unclear how the genetic testing
concerned familial, procreative, or life planning matters of the tribe.343 Also,
since quasi-property is a possessory interest, its right holder should be a
person having a close relationship to the object.344 In this circumstance, the
member who donated the tissue, if the member were still alive, should be
considered such a person.
Thus, with respect to quasi-property, individual members of the
Cherokee Nation could have regained their genetic materials or subjectidentifiable information, not the tribe. The tribe may have a supportive role
in realizing the relief to its members.

340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

See supra Argument Sections A, B.
See supra Argument Sections B.
See supra Argument Section B.
See supra note 4 and accompanying texts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a.
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E. Decisions to Use or Not to Use
The ASU Incident illustrates why genetic/genomic information obtained
from human tissues should be protected from unauthorized use and
disclosure.345 Senator Warren’s apology to the Cherokee Nation reminded us
of the conflict among different interests in using or not using genetic/genomic
information.346 Quasi-property fills the gap left by other approaches.347
Quasi-property provides protection for genetic/genomic information when
there is a nexus between the substance and dignity and the autonomy of a
tissue donor.348
CONCLUSION
Genetic/genomic information is a source of scientific advancement and a
source of controversy. Unconsented use of genetic/genomic information can
stigmatize tissue donors and affects numerous stakeholders. Privacy tort
claims are largely ineffective against genetic/genomic research conductors.
Quasi-property rights strike the right balance among conflicting interests and
defend a key piece of privacy epitomized in human tissues and
genetic/genomic information. Recent opinions suggest that quasi-property
should be available for tissue donors who seek recovery of materials and
information that are essential to their dignity.349

345.
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See supra Argument Section C.
See supra Argument Section D.
See supra Argument Section B.
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